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Moral hazard, optimal healthcare-seeking behavior, and competitive equilibrium. 
Sergey Malakhov 
Ph.D., Applied Economics, 
Pierre-Mendès-France University, 
Grenoble, France  
"I will not take up your time, dear boy, with telling you what is 
the matter with me. Life is brief, and you might pass away before 
I had finished. But I will tell you what is not the matter with me. 
I have not got housemaid's knee. Why I have not got housemaid's 
knee, I cannot tell you; but the fact remains that I have not got it. 
Everything else, however, I have got." 
Jerome K.Jerome  
«Three man in a boat (to say nothing of the dog.)» 
 
Abstract 
 
The theory of the optimal-consumption leisure choice under price dispersion describes the 
phenomenon of moral hazard as the customer’s reaction on unfair insurance policy. The unfair 
insurance offer does not equalize marginal costs of propensity to seek healthcare with marginal 
benefits on purchase. Under unfair insurance policy consumers increase ex post healthcare 
seeking activities and they optimize their consumption of medical services. The analysis of 
moral hazard results in the assumption that for an unfair offer there is an increase in the time 
horizon of the insurance policy that makes it fair and moral hazard becomes inefficient. The time 
horizon competition between insurance companies can eliminate moral hazard effect that clears 
the way to the competitive equilibrium. 
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1.Introduction 
While the history of the problem of moral hazard goes back to the 17th century, its scientific 
analysis started only in the last century, when Kenneth Arrow published his prominent article on 
health insurance. That article opened the wide discussion in economics and law. “Rivers of ink 
have been spilled discussing the moral hazard problem of insurance and ways to mitigate 
it.”(Ben-Shahar and Logue 2012, p.199). As usual, applied economics grew faster than its 
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theoretical basis. Nevertheless, works of M.Pauly, J.Stiglitz, M.Spence and R.Zeckhauser 
developed the theory of ideal insurance, proposed by Arrow. In 2009 Zwietfel et al. in “Health 
Economics” had summarized microeconomic visions of the moral hazard in health insurance.  
The standard microeconomic analysis of the phenomenon of moral hazard focuses on the 
consumer’s wealth under the expected utility. The theory of the optimal consumption-leisure 
choice under price dispersion can propose an interesting extension to the traditional 
microeconomic vision of the moral hazard with the set of assumptions of the present utility. The 
optimal consumer choice depends on the search for low prices. In health insurance the price of 
contract depends on customers’ precautionary efforts. While the price discrimination in the 
health industry is strictly regulated and sometimes prohibited, there are some ways for insurers 
to motivate the riskless behavior and to propose lower prices for careful applicants. People can 
stop smoking, they can undertake health-enhancing activities in gyms and pools, and finally they 
can choose medical underwriting in order to provide the information for insurance companies 
and to decrease payments. The propensity to search, the key variable of the model of optimal 
search, takes the form of the propensity to seek healthcare. 
However, even healthcare seeking behavior does not eliminate moral hazard, which, in its ex 
post form of the increase in demand for medical services, stays the most statistically significant 
phenomenon (Zwietfel and Manning 2000). The model of the optimal consumption-leisure 
choice under price dispersion enlightens some microeconomic mechanisms of moral hazard and 
tries to dispel the illusion of “unlimited demand for free medical services” that follows the 
phenomenon of moral hazard in economic literature. 
2.Price dispersion in health insurance. 
The understanding of the phenomenon of moral hazard as a specific form of the optimal 
consumption-leisure choice needs the reassignment of the standard set of variables to the case of 
health insurance. Here we have the problem maxU(Q,H) subject to w∂P/∂S|const=Q/∂L/∂S, where 
the value w represents the given wage rate, the value ∂P/∂Sconst<0 represents the given price 
discount, which depends on healthcare activities, the value of consumption Q represents a 
medical service under  the insurance claim, and the variable ∂L/∂S<0 represents the propensity 
to seek healthcare, i.e., propensity to substitute labor L for healthcare activities S. The (Q,H) 
utility is maximized when: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L + S
T =Q
∂P
∂S (1)  
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Fig.1. Optimal consumption-leisure choice under price dispersion. 
 
The modern economic theory presents the first-best insurance contract as the full insurance that 
also requires some precautionary observable effort e. The model of the optimal consumption-
leisure choice supports that conclusion but it adds some important remarks. 
While the modern economic theory insists on the tangibility of the precautionary effort, i.e., this 
effort should represent either direct expenditures or the monetary equivalent of the disutility of 
the effort itself, the model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice pays attention to the fact 
that monetary equivalent of the precautionary effect depends on income, here on the wage rate. 
Thus, the time spent on this effort should be different for different levels of the wage rate. The 
same thing should happen with the price for the insurance contract.  
Then, if a precautionary effort is costly, these should be always a trade-off between costs on 
healthcare seeking and a price of purchase. Hence there should be a price with zero 
precautionary effort. At the optimal level the marginal cost of the precautionary effort should 
equal its marginal benefit. The model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice pays attention 
to the fact that at some level of income w, price of purchase QP=wL, and the price reduction 
∂P/∂S, there is an optimal solution with zero healthcare seeking costs S: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L
T =Q
∂P
∂S (2)  
Here the individual chooses the lowest level of precautionary effort e=0. 
If healthcare-seeking behavior represents a particular form of search for low prices, the 
competitive market takes the shape of the equilibrium price dispersion (Malakhov 2016) where 
consumers with different propensities to seek healthcare and therefore different willingness to 
pay for the insurance policy meet different fair insurance policies (Fig.2) 
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Fig.2. Equilibrium price dispersion. 
 
Let’s take Figure 2 as the illustration of the equilibrium price dispersion for the full coverage 
Q=1. We see that people with different income spend different labor time L in order to buy the 
full coverage as well as they spent different time S for healthcare seeking, i.e., for precautionary 
efforts. The competition between insurers enforces them to meet customers’ different willingness 
to pay and to take into account different time spent on the purchase of full coverage. And 
insurance companies propose policies with different time horizons. 
The equilibrium price dispersion follows the transformation of the Equation 1: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L + S
T =Q
∂P
∂S ;
MRS(HforQ) = − wT∂P /∂S =
w
Pe
(3)
wn (Ln + Sn ) = −QTn∂Pn /∂Sn =QPe
 
 
Here all purchase prices QPn=wnLn represent derivative values of one equilibrium price. The 
equilibrium price equals to the full coverage policy for people with zero healthcare seeking costs 
S. Other words, it equals to the willingness to pay of a consumer who a) does not want to waste 
time on precautionary efforts; b) does not care about his health, and, c) cannot make 
precautionary efforts.  
The logic of the model also needs the equality of that willingness to pay with the willingness to 
accept or to sell of another consumer who undertakes health-enhancing activities and who seeks 
for healthcare. Indeed, if total costs of the insurance policy, labor time for the purchase itself and 
the time for precautionary efforts, exceed the equilibrium price, a consumer can stop health-
enhancing activities; he can reject the medical underwriting and buy the full coverage at the 
equilibrium price level. Finally, unsatisfied consumer can quit the market uninsured when he 
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meets a take-it-or-leave-it offer. It means that the insurance company should propose for careful 
consumers fair policies that take into account efforts on healthcare. Unfortunately, while 
consumers are price-takers, they depend on insurers’ ability to gather accurate information about 
these efforts of insurance applicants. If the information is collected properly, consumers can 
expect fair prices and they do not need additional efforts on healthcare. We suppose that these 
additional efforts, ambulatory care visits to physician offices and hospitals, named ex post 
moral hazard, take place when the insurance policy is unfair. 
The question why insurance contracts could be unfair needs very detailed applied analysis. They 
are administrative costs, costs of investment management and some other overheads that 
increase premiums. That analysis is left beyond this paper, which pays its attention to the 
consumers’ reaction on unfair policy. And the starting point for the analysis of consumers’ 
reaction on unfair price is clear. Even Arrow had to admit the fact that when consumers were 
risk-averse they could accept slightly unfair premiums: “From the point of view of the individual, 
since he has a strict preference for the actuarially fair policy over assuming the risks himself, he 
will still have a preference for an actuarially unfair policy, provided, of course, that it is not too 
unfair.” (Arrow 1963, p.960). 
 
3.Moral hazard as the process of optimization. 
There are some important notions that stay beyond the key equation of the model. First, we 
should precise the allocation of time for a good named “insurance policy”. A consumer needs 
labor time L in order to buy a policy and to get indirect access to medical services. Then he 
spends some time S on healthcare that, as he thinks, makes the access to medical services 
cheaper. The comparative statics divides the value of healthcare seeking behavior into ex ante 
healthcare efforts and ex post activities. In the “common model” of behavior (see Malakhov 
2015) these activities decrease not only the labor time L but also leisure time H. Indeed, visits to 
hospitals reduce our leisure. The case of physical training in gyms and pools is more 
complicated, while such activities could be regarded as leisure. Here we meet a black box of the 
modern theory of allocation of time, which cannot present for the moment a satisficing 
methodology for the analysis of such “dual activities”, like gardening, pet care, etc. that can be 
treated as non-market activities as well as leisure (see Aguiar and Hurst 2007). However, the 
model of optimal healthcare seeking behavior can override this methodological barrier. Buying 
the insurance policy, a consumer gets a specific form of leisure. This is tranquility, the quiet state 
when he does not bother about his health. Thus, the time of leisure of a good “insurance policy” 
includes the working time, search, and leisure for all other goods. From this point of view the 
time in gyms and pools really represents a form of healthcare. As a result, buying an insurance 
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policy, a consumer tries to maximize the utility of quiet state H and of an access to medical 
treatment Q. 
The price reduction ∂P/∂S can be got only by the confirmation of ex ante healthcare activities. 
When the insurance contract is signed, if it does not specify some ex post activities, ex post 
healthcare-seeking behavior cannot change both the price and its corresponding discount. And 
under the contract the marginal precautionary effort takes the following form (Eq.4): 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L + Sexante
T (4)  
 
The consumer does not calculate marginal values. But it might be not true for the insurance 
company. A provider who tries to understand customer’s willingness to pay and to make 
precautionary efforts has enough means even to re-construct the individual propensity to seek 
healthcare, But if the information is asymmetric, the insurer can miss some hidden action of 
healthcare and the evaluation of the precautionary effort Scontract will be less than the actual 
healthcare seeking behavior Sex ante,  and the offer will be definitely unfair. However, from the 
point of view of the equilibrium price dispersion the unfair policy, even if its slightly unfair, 
means that total costs of the careful applicant for the access to medical treatment Q are greater 
than the equilibrium expenditures, or 
w(L + Sexante )> −QT
∂P
∂S =QPe (5) 	  Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
Sexante
wLc
QPC
T
QP(S)
QPe
L
wLc(S)
−∂P / ∂Sw
 
 
Fig.3. Purchase of unfair insurance policy. 
 
If we re-arrange the Equation 5, we get the following result: 
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−w L + SexanteT > Q
∂P
∂S (6)  
or the absolute value of marginal costs of purchase are greater than the absolute value of its 
marginal benefit. 
When the values of price discount ∂P/∂S and the time horizon of the insurance policy T are fixed 
with the purchase, for the given wage rate w we get the line of budget constraint and the 
hypothetical optimal consumer choice at the point C of the utility of contract UC (Fig.3): 
T H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UC
C
 
Fig.4. Hypoyhetical optimal choice of unfair insurance policy. 
 
But this choice is really hypothetical. The inequality of marginal values, presented in Equation 6, 
disperse this illusion of optimality: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L + S
T > Q
∂P
∂S
−
w
T∂P /∂S >
Q
L + S (7)
 
or the utility curve at the point C is flatter than the budget constraint. And we get the suboptimal 
solution (Fig.5): 
	   8	  
T H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UC C
 
Fig.5. Suboptimal consumption-leisure choice under unfair insurance policy. 
 
The unfair policy means that the insurance contract is not optimal. The Equation 6 tells us that 
either the purchase price PC is too high due to some overhead costs, or the insurance company 
underestimates ex ante healthcare activities. Thus, the offer becomes unfair from the point of 
view of the applicant. 
But the consumer can adjust the contract to his needs and get the satisficing as well as optimal 
solution.1 When the budget constraint is given, he can move along it in the north-west direction. 
When the labor time L ix fixed by the purchase, the individual substitutes the time of leisure H 
by healthcare seeking Sex post (here do not forget about specificity of “leisure” under insurance 
policy, it might be working and searching time, and the time of enjoyment of other goods). The 
consumer does not calculate marginal values. He simply searches for the satisficing solution. For 
example, people can seek early treatment in order to avoid hospitalization in future. And this 
decision becomes optimal when consumer increases access to medical treatment Q. He begins to 
visit physicians. As a result he raise the utility level of the insurance contract UC to the level of 
moral hazard utility UMH (Fig.6): 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The analysis of the transformation of explicit satisficing decision into implicit optimal solution is presented in 
Malakhov (2014) and Malakhov (2016). 
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T H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UCC
EMH
UMH
 
Fig.6. Moral hazard. 
 
Indeed, the consumer increases the intensity of consumption Q/H proposed by the insurance 
policy. And his visits to physicians become more frequent. The consumer increases the absolute 
value of the marginal propensity to seek health care because in the static world he can get the 
following satisficing optimal result2: 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L + Sexante + Sex post
T =Qexpost
∂P
∂S (9)  
 
From the first point of view it looks like a paradox. Why the consumer substitutes leisure for 
visits to physicians when total costs of healthcare are already high? The answer is in the simple 
mathematics. Let’s suppose that healthcare activity S represents the number of physicians’ visits 
Q times the duration of one visit. The consumer accepts the medical underwriting and he 
confirms the state of his health ex ante by some medical analysis. Being unsatisfied with the 
contract, he continues to visit physicians, now ex post under the insurance. Thus, he increases 
both Sex post and Qex post values. However, the Equations 1-3 show us that when the values of S 
and Q are increasing at the same rate, the absolute value of marginal benefits |Q∂P/∂Sconst| is 
growing faster than the absolute value of marginal costs |w∂L/∂S|. Thus, the arrival to the 
optimal choice EMH under moral hazard is inevitable. 
Here we can see that the phenomenon of moral hazard does not represent an “unlimited demand 
for free goods”. Leaving the point C of the unfair policy, the consumer stops at the point EMH. 
The marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption (MRS H for Q) at the point C of the 
utility curve UC is too low. There are too much leisure (MUL is low) and a deficit of consumption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 If the contract specifies some ex post observable activities like clinical examination, the consumer can increase 
both the consumption of extra medical services as well as the the total Sex post time for such activities. 
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(MUC is great). Moving from C to EMH, the individual decreases the time of leisure and increases 
the consumption. Thus, the MRS H for Q is rising. But this value cannot grow infinitely. Once 
the individual understands that he has sacrificed enough leisure for medical treatment. The best 
illustration of the moral hazard as the process of optimization can be found in the article “The 
Moral-Hazard Myth”, written by M.Gladwell for The New Yorker where he cited U.Reinhardt, 
professor of political economy in Princeton University and the prominent scholar in healthcare 
economics: “Moral hazard is overblown…You always hear that the demand for health care is 
unlimited. This is just not true. People who are very well insured, who are very rich, do you see 
them check into the hospital because it’s free? Do people really like to go to the doctor? Do they 
check into the hospital instead of playing golf?” (Gladwell 2005). 
Here U.Reinhardt pays attention to the income level that reduces moral hazard. This is only a 
part of the story, but it is very important. We see that the reason for moral hazard is hidden in the 
high absolute value of marginal losses |w∂L/∂S| that depends on the wage rate. But there is also 
the value of propensity to seek healthcare ∂L/∂S. And this value represents a real pitfall for 
insurance companies. 
Facing the problem of moral hazard, insurers are dreaming about “ideal customer” who has no 
spare time to visit doctors. Other words, they are looking for people with high marginal value of 
time. The model of the optimal consumption-leisure choice equitizes the marginal value of time 
with marginal costs of search (Malakhov 2015). And the latter depends not only on income but 
also on the propensity to search. The inequality of marginal values of the healthcare seeking 
(Equation 6) can be formed not only by high values of income w and unfair premiums 
wLC=QPC, but also by an important investment in ex ante healthcare Sex ante. People who really 
take care of their health do not stop after the purchase of the insurance policy. They continue to 
seek healthcare, now with means of insurance. And they substitute leisure H for healthcare 
seeking Sex post. They are really healthcare seekers. Unfortunately, health economics paid little 
attention to that phenomenon but sometimes it discovers interesting trends. For example, Ç.Koç 
(2005) stated the fact that the econometric results indicated that the moral hazard effect for 
physician visit was higher at relatively higher levels of wealth.  
Does it mean that the behavior of healthcare seekers can turn to moral hazard even when the 
insurance policy is fair? Other words, does a fair insurance contract cannot eliminate moral 
hazard? Theoretically, the answer for these questions is negative because the fair insurance 
policy equalizes total marginal efforts, labor and healthcare seeking, with the marginal benefit on 
purchase. The consumer finds an option that satisfices him. The “it’s enough” reasoning stops 
immediately any additional effort. This additional effort, here again we come to our simple 
mathematics, rises the marginal benefit faster than marginal losses. And the consumer gets 
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another, inverse inequality of marginal values. This new inequality corresponds to the steeper 
utility level, which stays below the moral hazard utility UMH (Fig.7): 
T H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UC
UMH
EMH
C
 
Fig.7. Stability of moral hazard solution. 
 
The same effect takes place when an applicant receives a fair offer. Having such an offer, the 
customer does not need any moral hazard effort because it decreases his utility. Even when the 
consumer starts smoking after the purchase of full coverage, he understands that now he should 
loose some time on the chest X-ray. 
Here we can also get the answer to the question what happens if a customer with zero 
precautionary efforts buys the full coverage at the equilibrium price level and then changes his 
behavior that results in moral hazard. The previous analysis of the equilibrium price dispersion 
discovers the trend when “shoppers”, people with zero search costs, become “searchers” with 
positive search costs (Malakhov 2016). There producers are willing to create a new market and 
they add to their product some complementary services. If “shoppers” accept new high prices, 
they pay. But if reasons for a new price seem to be unfair, “shoppers” become “searchers” and 
they begin to look for a lower price. The same effect takes place in insurance. If the price for full 
coverage looks unfair for an applicant who does not make any precautionary effort, it means that 
the absolute value of the marginal propensity to seek healthcare, here with zero precautionary 
effort but with high willingness to pay, is greater than the marginal benefit and total costs on 
insurance are greater that equilibrium expenditures (Eq.10): 
w ∂L
∂S = −w
L
T > Q
∂P
∂S ⇒ wL > −QT∂P /∂S =QPe (10)  
Substituting some leisure time H by healthcare seeking time Sex post, the “shopper” becomes a 
“searcher”. He adds to his labor time some healthcare seeking time and begins to visit physicians 
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(Fig.8): 
T H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UCC
Sexpost L
EMH
UMH
 
Fig.8. Moral hazard of individual with zero ax ante healthcare seeking costs. 
 
There is another interesting question. Does the equilibrium under moral hazard EMC represents a 
real optimal solution? The reaction of insurance companies on moral hazard effect tells us that 
the answer for that question is also negative. But it means that our analysis is not finished yet 
and we should try to find a solution, which would be optimal not only for consumers but also for 
insurance companies. 
 
4.Moral hazard and the competitive equilibrium. 
For the moment, the moral hazard solution does not look as the competitive equilibrium but like 
some derivative of a monopoly offer. To find the competitive solution we should come back to 
the equilibrium price dispersion where offers of insurance companies depends on different 
propensities to seek healthcare and where they are ready to increase time horizons of insurance 
policies for careful applicants. 
If we come back to the inequality of marginal values of health care seeking (Equation 6), we can 
see that the great absolute value of marginal costs can be diminished by the increase in the time 
horizon T of the consumption-leisure choice, i.e., by the prolongation of the insurance policy. 
The implementation of consumer-driving health plans (CDHP) demonstrates that it is possible. 
Employers create for their employees special accounts that can be carried over indefinitely into 
retirement by individuals with low health care expenditures (Farnsworth 2006, p.265). And we 
can see that the increase in the time horizon provides an individual with more leisure at the same 
level of consumption, which becomes optimal Q* under new terms (Fig.9):  
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Q
− w
∂P /∂S
UC
UE
E
T '
UMH
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EMH
w∂L/∂S
∂P /∂S
=Q*
 
Fig.9.Competitive equilibrium under new time horizon. 
 
Here an individual can increase his utility not only with respect to the initial offer, that is obvious 
with the same level of consumption and with the increase in leisure time, but also with respect to 
possible moral hazard solution. If an individual gets an unfair offer, i.e., unfair price, he could 
plan in advance some moral hazard efforts in order to compensate the unfair price. The increase 
in time horizon discovers this hidden action and the new contract proposes a trade-off between 
price wL=QP and time horizon T. And moral hazard becomes uninteresting as well as 
inefficient. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
The theory of the optimal-consumption leisure choice under price dispersion describes the 
phenomenon of moral hazard as the customer’s reaction on unfair insurance policy. The unfair 
insurance offer does not equalize marginal costs of propensity to seek healthcare with marginal 
benefits on purchase. Under unfair insurance policy consumers increase ex post healthcare 
seeking activities and they optimize their consumption of medical services. The analysis of 
moral hazard results in the assumption that for an unfair offer there is an increase in the time 
horizon of the insurance policy that makes it fair and moral hazard becomes inefficient. The time 
horizon competition between insurance companies can eliminate moral hazard effect that clears 
the way to the competitive equilibrium. 
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